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In December 2007, the 13th conference of the parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Bali Road Map, initiating a two-
track negotiation process towards a comprehensive post-2012 climate agreement. 
Besides providing the necessary institutional framework for the discussions on the 
future shape of the climate regime, one of its major achievements was to clearly 
indicate COP-15 (which will take place in December 2009 in Copenhagen) as a deadline 
by when negotiations had to be finalized. 545 days and numerous meetings later, the 
outcomes of the most recent round of negotiations, held between 1 and 12 June 2009 
in Bonn (and referred to as Bonn-2), strongly suggest that negotiators have begun to 
come under serious pressure to meet this deadline. Progress at both the 6th meeting of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(AWG-LCA) and the 8th meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments 
for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) has been slow.  
Where do we stand after Bonn-2? 
Most parties seem to believe that the familiar strategy of “backloading” – i.e. holding 
off decisions until the very end of a negotiation process and operating on the 
assumption that nothing is agreed until everything is – will yield the necessary results 
in Copenhagen. Yet, as time is ticking away, questions arise as to whether this is a valid 
strategic choice and – given the pace and ever-increasing complexity of the 
negotiations – if and what COP-15 can deliver. It had to be clear from the start that the 
road to a Copenhagen agreement would be long and winding. Typically, complex 
multilateral negotiations go through a series of phases: a pre-negotiation, an issue-
definition, an initial positioning, a formula-building, a detailing, and a ratification phase.  
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Transitions between these phases usually occur when parties reach some form of a  
critical juncture or crossroads at which they alter their behavior, textual proposals are 
merged, and compromises brokered. 
Talks in the AWG-LCA 6 pretty much remained in the initial positioning phase. 
However, while positions had already been stated at earlier occasions, this time around 
they at least found their way into a single, pre-structured document, as parties went 
through a first and second reading of the chair’s proposal for a negotiating text. With 
hardly any debate, the chair’s text was transformed into an over 200 pages long 
compilation of positions. The daunting challenge for negotiators at the next 
preparatory meetings will be to shorten the extensive lists of options on many items so 
as to eventually produce the compromise formulas that will be submitted for adoption 
at the December COP.  In a similar vein, the Bonn talks remained stuck in the 
positioning phase under the AWG-KP track. Although the contact groups formed by the 
chair allowed for more substantive discussions than in the AWG-LCA, no single, 
coherent text emerged from them. Some of the informal discussions tended to be very 
controversial, alienating developed and developing countries on issues such as 
aggregate emission reductions for Annex I countries and legal matters. This as well as 
the much-criticized Japanese offer to reduce emissions by 15% until 2020 (compared to 
2005 levels, which represents a fairly modest 8% reduction compared to 1990 levels) 
will not exactly ease the transition into subsequent negotiation phases.  
Two tracks and numerous issue linkages 
In addition to these limited advances within the two groups, and despite criticism 
voiced by the European Union (EU) and other developed countries regarding the 
continued separation of the two negotiation tracks, no decision could be reached on 
the future organization of the work as well as the legal form of the negotiations’ final 
outcome. Thus, for the time being, all options remain on the table. The prolonged 
segregation of the two tracks will continue to further complicate the talks, which have 
already reached a high degree of complexity. This complexity is due to numerous issue  
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linkages deliberately introduced by parties within each of the AWGs. Such linkages 
have been particularly visible in the AWG-LCA, where, for example, many developing 
countries apparently consider a connection between the nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs) they may have to undertake under a future agreement and 
developed country support via financial assistance or technology transfer as a conditio 
sine qua non of their negotiation positions. This will render separate discussions of the 
components of the Bali Action Plan (shared vision for long-term cooperative action, 
mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology) during subsequent phases of the AWG 
deliberations close to impossible.   
Time is running out   
Against this backdrop, key players in the negotiations offered mixed assessments of the 
progress and prospects of the talks. Some, including the U.S. head of delegation 
Jonathan Pershing and UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer, (publicly) remained 
fairly optimistic by characterizing the proceedings in Bonn as a necessary exercise in 
exchanging views on the way to Copenhagen. Others displayed pessimism. Countries 
like India and South Africa expressed their disappointment with the lack of ambition of 
their Annex I counterparts, exemplified by the Japanese target proposal, and with the 
overall progress achieved. The European Union’s head of delegation Artur Runge-
Metzger pointed to the difficulty of assessing the considerable amount of textual 
proposals under the AWG-LCA track in the limited time that remains until December.   
Sheer time constraints – less than half a year is left before the Copenhagen summit 
starts – indeed represent one of the major challenges. A comprehensive agreement at 
COP 15 may now only be possible if full advantage is taken of most – if not all – of the 
ample opportunities for which the calendar in the second half of 2009 provides. The 
two AWGs will meet three more times (in August for Bonn-3, in September/October in 
Bangkok and in early November in Barcelona) before COP-15. Outside the UNFCCC 
context, various multilateral meetings will accompany the negotiation process: a Major 
Economies Forum in Mexico in June, the G8 meeting in July in Italy, a high-level event 
negotiators at all levels be prepared to make the necessary steps towards each other? 
Substantially, the Bali Road Map does not appear to provide enough guidance on the 
conduct of the negotiations. As a result, negotiators struggle with technical questions 
and issues of procedure, e.g., whether the legal  
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initiated by the UN Secretary General in New York on 22 September, and another G20 
summit in Pittsburgh in late September. In addition, important bilateral meetings will 
take place gathering the U.S. and China, the U.S. and the EU, China and the EU as well 
as many other Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The quantity of meetings during the 
remaining 180 days between Bonn-2 and the supposedly decisive high-level segment at 
COP-15 could still suffice for reaching an agreement in Copenhagen. 
Wanted: stronger political steering 
What seems to be crucial, however, is the quality that all these exchanges will take. 
Will they be purely technical and serve to exchange positions, or will form of the 
negotiations’ outcome should follow its function – which would imply that a pragmatic 
wait-and-see approach to the talks precedes any decision on whether to adopt an 
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, a completely new treaty or some other form of 
agreement – or whether the legal framework should be defined before substance is 
decided. In the face of such problems, firm political guidance is highly desirable in order 
to set the negotiations on the right track towards the ultimate objective of agreeing on 
an environmentally effective deal at COP-15. Stronger steering by high-ranking 
politicians is especially required at the critical junctures marking the transition between 
the positioning, formula-building and detailing phases. After all, the key issues that will 
allow for agreeing on a reform of the UN climate regime require deeply political, 
redistributive choices: it is not a secret that the probability of getting to a deal in 
Copenhagen will increase with the extent to which the expectations in the developed 
and the developing countries can be matched.  
Backloading when a push forward is needed 
Many developed countries have declared that they are willing to make significant 
emission cuts, but only if, one, their peers make similar efforts and, two, major 
developing country emitters agree to undertake their own reduction efforts (whose 
type and scope are yet to be determined). As for the latter condition, emerging 
countries make such efforts conditional on the transfer of technology and financial  
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resources for both mitigation and adaptation. To date, no party has displayed an 
unconditional commitment to move ahead of the others with an ambitious and 
complete package. To be sure, the EU has pledged a unilateral emissions reductions 
target of -20% by 2020 compared to its 1990 levels – but it still shies away from 
specifying the scope of its financial contribution. Other developed countries have 
neither stated concrete targets and timetables nor offered assistance. Meanwhile, the 
emerging countries also hold back what exactly they are prepared to put on the table. 
This type of backloading as a strategy may well not work out this time. There is a real 
danger that the negotiations are way too complex to assume that a last-minute deal like 
the one struck in Kyoto can be repeated. The 1997 Kyoto COP produced only politically 
negotiated reduction targets and several flexible market mechanisms whose effective 
functioning was all but clear at the time of the Protocol’s adoption. What is more, most 
of the intricate North-South issues, in particular the key question of developing country 
commitments, were settled before the final COP at that time. This made the Kyoto 
meeting turn essentially into a bargaining session about targets among the U.S., the EU 
and Japan. It is unlikely that, following the current pace and approach, many of the 
crucial political issue will be clarified going into COP-15, leaving much – too much? – to 
the final days of talks. 
The need for greater political investment 
For these reasons, and to solve the identified “catch-22” situation, strategic choices have 
to be made which require determination at the highest political level. Many of the 
world’s leaders, ranging from U.S. President Obama to various EU heads of state to the 
Chinese government, have acknowledged that climate change is high politics with a firm 
place on their agenda. If they mean what they are openly stating, these politicians would 
be well-advised to play a greater role by closely accompanying the international 
negotiation process as it enters the decisive phases before COP-15. Greater political 
investment should happen in two ways: Firstly, political leaders ought to send clear 
messages on what to expect from the Copenhagen summit, identify priorities on which  
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the negotiations should focus, and thus accelerate and steer the process towards the 
desired outcome. Everyone has to be able to see, for instance, whether the 
governments want to reach agreement on emissions reduction targets as the essence 
of a new climate regime or rather on the reform of the regime’s governance structures 
first, and what level of detail they expect the final outcome to take. Secondly, political 
leaders ought to put more cards on the table at an earlier stage of the process through 
a greater disclosure of their country’s position – e.g. their financial contributions – 
inciting others to do the same. Only this way, they would send a strong signal of their 
government’s seriousness with regard to climate change. Only such transparency and 
guidance will facilitate the task of the negotiators at the preparatory meetings. The 
plethora of gatherings outside the UNFCCC negotiation tracks could be used to give 
the necessary political impulses and guidance to the United Nations talks, without, 
however, “hijacking” or replacing the UN process. Greater political involvement early 
in the talks would further give the entire process a higher degree of credibility and 
underscore the urgency of the matter, living up to the expectations of citizens all over 
the world. 
Keeping COP-15 as a deadline 
Facing the grave challenges in current climate talks, greater political investment 
through key strategic choices is arguably the best way of preventing the risk of the 
negotiations losing momentum before or at Copenhagen. Rumors about the 
possibilities of convening a COP-15bis (i.e. a continuation of the Copenhagen summit) 
in 2010 could already be heard in the corridors of the conference hotel in Bonn. For 
certain parties, such a delay of the process might actually come in handy, as it would 
give their negotiating teams more time to react to domestic policy developments. This 
is especially the case for the U.S., where climate legislation is currently (and for an 
indeterminate time) under discussion in Congress. Since international treaties require 
the ratification of the Senate, a domestic climate law would provide the American 
negotiators with a more solid basis on which to conduct international talks. Above all,  
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it would considerably help them to avoid a repetition of the discouraging Kyoto Protocol 
experience: at COP-3, U.S. negotiators agreed to a deal that clearly did not meet prior 
demands from the Senate for a balanced international climate treaty involving also 
“scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing 
Country Parties” (Byrd-Hagel Resolution of July 1997), and therefore stood no chance of 
ratification. 
Given the Kyoto experience and the importance of the United States to global climate 
policy, the argument that the climate change debate in the U.S. Congress must be taken 
into account in the international negotiations is widely accepted. Yet, it is far from 
certain that the domestic political conditions in the U.S. and elsewhere will be any more 
favorable in 2010 than at the end of this year. Further, simply allowing for more time in 
the international negotiations does not necessarily imply that the current gridlocks will 
be solved. On the contrary, postponing the talks altogether, just like leaving the 
outcome completely open until the very end of COP-15, carries the risk of losing 
momentum and getting – if at all – to an agreement that will be far from meeting the 
reductions that science imposes on the negotiations. Instead of delaying the entire 
process, COP-15 ought to be kept as a deadline, and the United States and other leading 
parties should collectively clarify how they intend to stay within the time frame they set 
for themselves in the Bali Road Map by outlining what the COP realistically can and 
should deliver, and which agenda items could – if necessary – be shifted to a clearly 
delimited follow-up negotiation process.  
Reconsider negotiations strategies! 
All things considered, in order to avoid that Copenhagen becomes just a meaningless pit 
stop on a road that turned out to be much longer than anticipated or, even worse, a 
dead end for the post-2012 negotiation process altogether, a reconsideration of 
negotiation strategies for the climate talks is utterly needed. Instead of prolonging the 
position-stating phase and technical discussions ad infinitum, crucial political issues  
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should be tackled long before COP-15. To this end, high-level politicians from across 
the globe need to take greater ownership of the negotiation process now. In so doing, 
they would not only acknowledge the importance of the threat posed by climate 
change, but also heighten the chances that one of the most complex multilateral 
negotiations in history will end in success.   
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